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Despite party pressures, House members’ support for their
leadership in procedural votes is not guaranteed.
Control of the floor agenda in the U.S. House of Representatives is integral if the majority party
wishes to achieve its political and electoral aims. In new research, Jamie L. Carson, Michael H.
Crespin, and Anthony J. Madonna find that parties will call on their members’ support during
important procedural votes – which influence what is discussed, and the scope and length of the
debate – when it is unlikely that voters will punish members for their support.  However, despite
these party pressures, members’ support is not guaranteed – more moderate and conservative
members are less likely to support the leadership when requested.
Proponents of partisan influence in the United States House of Representatives believe that
legislative outcomes can be manipulated for both electoral and policy benefits.  Generally, these
scholars argue that party organizations accomplish this through their control of the agenda-setting
process.  Underlying these theories is the assumption that the rank-and-file will vote with the
party leadership on important agenda setting procedural votes in order to promote the desired
outcome.  Recent empirical work has confirmed the theoretical intuition that these procedural
votes are of the highest priority to party organizations.
The theory underlying increased party pressure on procedural votes is two-fold.  First, these votes
allow the majority party to bring certain issues to the floor, regulate the scope of the substance
under consideration, and control the length and nature of the debate.  There is ample anecdotal
evidence demonstrating that leaders will attempt to punish members who defect on procedural
votes.  For example, in 2008, House Appropriations Chairman David Obey (D-WI) cancelled a
meeting with constituents from the office of Rep. Charlie Melancon (D-LA).  Melancon had
defected on a vote to order the previous question on a special rule the day before, leading Obey to tell the party
caucus that “anybody who wants to routinely vote against the leadership on procedural grounds, don’t ask me to
see their visiting firemen when they’re in town.”
Second, scholars note that procedural votes lack the “traceability” of amendment or final passage votes.  As such,
constituents are less likely to punish representatives for supporting the party’s position on a procedural matter. 
This traceability thesis provides a foundation for much of the research on legislative politics that argues the
majority party can use their control of the agenda-setting process to bias policy output away from the chamber
median.
We examine this issue by taking advantage of a set of Democratic Leadership Office emails that signal the
leadership’s positions on floor votes for parts of the 110th and 111th Congresses. We find that while leadership is
most likely to call for support on certain procedural votes that (1) may be said to lack traceability (in contrast to
votes on substantive policy, like amendments or final passage of a bill); (2) are of the highest importance to the
majority party (i.e. previous question votes on special rules, votes on the final passage of a special rule); and (3)
the majority has time to evaluate (i.e. motions to recommit yield a low percentage of signals), party support on
those votes is by no means guaranteed.  We find that while the most liberal members of the party vote with the
leadership on procedural votes at high rates and nearly 100 percent of the time when signaled by the majority
leader, moderate members are significantly less likely to support the party and are not responsive to these signals.
This is demonstrated in Figure 1, which plots the predicted support on signaled votes for members who are more
conservative than the floor median (blue), more liberal than the party median (green), and between the floor and
party medians (red). It is clear from the figure that the members who are more conservative than the floor median
are less likely to support the leadership when requested.
Figure 1 – Predicted Support (Signaled only)
In our view, defections on procedural votes make a
great deal of sense despite the perceived lack of
traceability.  The traceability thesis suggests that
members will be attacked for individual votes. 
However, in modern elections candidates are
frequently attacked by opponents and interest
groups for their aggregate voting record. For
example, in 2010, Republican candidates attacked
Representative Martin Heinrich (D-NM) for voting
with then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi 97% of the time,
Representative John Boccieri (D-OH) 93% of the
time and Representative Glen Nye (D-VA) for voting
with Pelosi 83% of the time. Rep. Gene Taylor (D-
MS) supported John McCain’s presidential
campaign in 2008, but he was still accused of
voting with leadership 82 percent of the time in the
lead up to the 2010 elections.
We might expect members in highly competitive
districts—like Taylor—to be most vulnerable to
these sorts of attacks. In Figure 2, we plot the difference in signaled and non-signaled support scores for some
outlying representatives for the 110th (green) and 111th (red) Congresses. These members represented districts
where the Democratic candidate for president received 50 percent or less of the vote but exhibited clearly different
strategies in heeding the call of the party. Since they all serve in districts with a substantial number of Republican
voters, being viewed as beholden to the party leadership is typically not the best way to secure reelection.
Figure 2 – Signal Responsiveness
Although these legislators represent competitive
districts, the members in the top group are
clearly toeing the party line on key procedural
roll calls. When the leadership sends signals,
they increase their support by between 14 and
23 percent compared to non-signaled votes.
Since the average baseline of support starts
above 90 percent, this is a pretty substantial
uptick.
Representatives in the bottom grouping appear
to run away when asked for support. Unlike the
average member, these representatives vote
with the party at lower rates on votes like moving
the previous question or passing a special rule.
Although we can only speculate, it is plausible
they are trying to deliberately lower their party
support scores to avoid ads that compare their
aggregate voting record with the Speaker of the
House (in this case, Nancy Pelosi).
Did either strategy pay off? Clearly neither was enough to overcome Republican waves in competitive districts
and of the 10 members in the figure, only one is now serving in the current 114th Congress. Running away may
have helped Jerry McNerney (D-CA) as he defeated Republican David Harmer in 2010 and then moved to a safer
district in 2012. Mike McIntyre (D-NC) won his 2012 election by 654 votes but retired at the end of the 113th
Congress. The remaining members were all defeated one way or another. Given this, in our view it is not the
perceived lack of traceability that yields high—though not absolute—support for the majority party on important
procedural votes, but the observation for most vulnerable members that a wave election will likely drag you under
no matter how fast you try to swim away from leadership.
This article is based on the paper ‘Procedural Signaling, Party Loyalty, and Traceability in the U.S. House of
Representatives’, in Political Research Quarterly.
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